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Abstract : This article analyses the relationship between national climate
change policy instruments and WTO rules with particular emphasis on the
case of Germany. Our main ﬁnding is that national policies whose aim is to
reduce greenhouse gases can be brought into compliance with international
trade law. Compliance can be achieved, ﬁrst, through various methods of
labelling electricity from renewable resources. Second, it can be achieved through
trading systems for green certiﬁcates that respect basic WTO principles. Third,
it can be achieved through energy taxes. To oﬀset the competitive impacts of
such taxes, border tax adjustments are a possibility. Although WTO law has
not yet clearly deﬁned the eligibility of border tax adjustments for energy taxes,
the balance of evidence suggests that it would support such adjustments under
certain circumstances. Fourth, compliance with WTO rules can be achieved
through ﬁnancial incentives to the producers of energy from renewable sources
which are conferred in such a way that they do not pass through the hands of
the government. Hence, climate change policies can even rely on ‘subsidies ’
(in the economic sense) without getting into conﬂict with WTO rules. Fifth,
when compliance cannot be achieved, national policies aiming at international
environmental protection can claim an exception under GATT Article XX
(b) or (g) if measures are not applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
In addition, countries should further strive to ﬁnd solutions to the global
climate change problem in the Kyoto process.
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1. Introduction1
The increasing climate change caused by emissions from energy production and
consumption is one of today’s most serious global environmental problems. Pro-
tecting the climate is a complex matter : the earth’s atmosphere is a global com-
mon, which is characterised by an inappropriate distribution of property rights.
Policy measures implemented in one region to protect it cannot exclude other
regions from the resulting beneﬁts, which results in the well-known free-rider
problem. Thus, as long as there is no international coordination of these policies,
there is a crucial lack of incentive for most nations to contribute to climate change
policy. Establishing this kind of coordination is the main objective of the Kyoto
Protocol (1997), which aims at a global reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. It lists core areas in which climate change policy measures should be
developed (for example, energy eﬃciency, agriculture, promotion of renewable
energy forms), but does not recommend speciﬁc policy tools.
Recent problems in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and its amendments and the
complete withdrawal of the USA in 2001, however, have again made clear the
conﬂicts of interest, varying assessments of the problem, and diﬀerent levels of
risk aversion both among the industrialised countries that are the major emitters
of GHGs and between industrialised and developing countries. These conﬂicts of
interest have hindered the implementation of optimal global policy measures up to
the present day. Thus, it seems that only decisive action by individual countries or
by coalitions of countries can ensure real progress in international climate change
policy.
However, national climate change policies based on multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) face another potential problem: they might infringe on WTO
law. For example, ﬁnancial support for the producers of energy from renewable
resources might violate the WTO’s agreement on subsidies. Neither WTO law nor
MEAs oﬀer clear-cut ex ante rules on how to handle such conﬂicts.2 Yet Article 2
of the Kyoto Protocol demands that ‘the Parties included in Annex I3 shall strive to
implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize
adverse eﬀects, including_ eﬀects on international trade’.
The purpose of our article is to analyse how national climate change policies can
be devised in such a way that they do not infringe on WTO law. We will show that
individual countries can implement national climate change policies without viol-
ating WTO rules or taking recourse to Article XX, without claiming precedence of
1 The authors would like to thank Michael Kohlhaas, Barbara Praetorius, Sabrina Shaw, Jan-Eirik
Sørensen, Rene´ Vossenaar and Hans-Joachim Ziesing for helpful comments on an earlier version of this
article as well as two anonymous referees who provided valuable advice for this version.
2 The debate about the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and
WTO rules is part of the general trade and environment discussions. For an overview see Althammer
and Dro¨ge (2003).
3 Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), listing all
developed member countries of the Convention.
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MEAs over the WTO agreements and without suﬀering competitive dis-
advantages. We cover the main national policy tools applied in today’s market
economies: standards, taxes, and subsidies. In addition, we discuss two new
instruments that are not yet widely used: labels and certiﬁcates. We also discuss
border tax adjustments, which are proposed in the literature as an instrument to
avoid the negative eﬀects of domestic energy taxes on the international competi-
tiveness of the economy or certain sectors. As a case study we look at energy policy
in Germany, where the reduction of GHG emissions has been made a central
energy policy goal, and existing programmes fostering renewable energy gener-
ation have been expanded, backed by a 1997 EU directive. By introducing
guaranteed minimum prices for electricity from renewable sources, Germany has
taken a distinctively diﬀerent path than other EU member states, some of which
have chosen instead to introduce production quotas for electricity from renewable
sources, combined with certiﬁcate trading.4 German energy policy also aims at
achieving a higher degree of energy eﬃciency, and a reduction in energy con-
sumption (see Appendix 1 for a brief description of relevant laws).
There are two climate change policies that we do not cover in this article. First,
we exclude the ﬂexibility mechanisms envisaged the Kyoto Protocol (that is, Clean
Development Mechanism in Article 12, Joint Implementation in Article 6, and
Emissions Trading in Article 17) because these systems, currently under con-
struction, depend on multilateral action and thus need an analysis that goes
beyond the scope and the intention of this article. However, we do discuss trade
in so-called green certiﬁcates, which yields implications for emissions trading as
well. Second, we exclude the long-standing issue of reducing subsidies for fossil
fuels – especially coal – because a reduction of such subsidies would not conﬂict
with WTO law. Hence, we concentrate on national policy instruments which
reduce total energy consumption, foster energy eﬃciency, and promote electricity
generation from renewable resources, and which might conﬂict with WTO law.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of WTO
rules and principles relevant to national climate change policies. In Sections 3, 4, 5,
and 6, we analyse the compatibility of labels, certiﬁcates, taxes, and subsidies,
respectively, with WTO rules. We conclude with a brief summary of our main
ﬁndings and their policy implications.
2. Relevant WTO regulations
The WTO trade regime contains a number of regulations that either directly or
indirectly aﬀect the way individual nations may implement national climate
change policy. These concepts, principles, and deﬁnitions are summarised in the
following.
4 See Bra¨uer et al. (2000).
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2.1 Basic principles
TheWTO trade regime relies on several basic principles. The most relevant for our
study are the most-favoured nation principle in Article I (1) GATT and the
national treatment principle in Article III (4) GATT. It states that: ‘The products
of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements aﬀecting their internal sale, oﬀering for sale, purchase, transpor-
tation, distribution or use’. Article I (1) GATT states that ‘any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties ’. They are the most important articles for the whole
WTO legal framework and aim to prevent discrimination between domestic and
foreign products.
2.2 Standards and technical regulations
National policies inﬂuencing economic activities are based mainly on standards
and technical regulations. A deﬁnition of standards and technical regulations is
included in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), a side
agreement to the GATT (McGovern, 2003: para. 7.24). As a rule, all standards
regulated by these agreements must be applied in accordance with the GATTmost-
favoured nation and national treatment principles. Both deﬁnitions, Annex 1.1
and 1.2 TBT Agreement, include processes and production methods (PPMs) as
criteria for the diﬀerentiation of products. However, neither deﬁnition makes it
clear whether non-product-related standards are subject to TBT rules.5
Nevertheless, we can state that three types of standards are distinguishable :
. product standards, which determine characteristics of a product during its
consumption;
. product-related standards, which address those characteristics of a product
that are determined by the production methods and are incorporated into the
product;
. non-product-related standards, which are related to the production methods
used but not to the product itself.
Several studies discussing the negotiation history of the TBT Agreement and panel
rulings on ‘like products ’ (see WTO–Alcoholic Beverages Panel, 1996) ﬁnd that
non-product-related criteria cannot be used as the basis for deﬁning ‘unlike
products’ under the TBT Agreement and GATT (see Chang, 1997; Michaelowa,
1997; Dro¨ge, 2001). This means that a country can use the ‘ like product’ concept
5 A deﬁnition of standards is included in the Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement: ‘Document_ that
provides_ characteristics for products or related processes and production methods. ’ The term ‘or
related’ has the purpose to explicitly exclude ‘non-related’ PPMs, according to Chang (1997: 147).
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to determine domestic standards for domestic producers, but cannot apply this
concept to distinguish among imported goods, or to discriminate against imported
goods to the beneﬁt of ‘ like’ domestic products. As the Asbestos Case implies
(Canada–France 2001, see WTO–Appellate Body, 2001), national law can, how-
ever, distinguish among products based on their PPMs and can apply the same
distinction to imports. Product-related PPM standards are incompatible with
WTO law only if they result in discrimination against imports (see Howse and
Tuerk, 2001: 289; Charnovitz, 2002).
2.3 The term ‘ like products ’
A crucial issue in the trade and environment debate is the term ‘like products ’. It is
included in Article III GATT and other WTO rules on trade in goods, and occurs
16 times throughout the GATT texts. The term was never clearly deﬁned. In 1970,
the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments recommended a case-by-case
examination of problems arising from the interpretation of this term (see BISD,
1997: para. 18). It deﬁned four criteria for the ‘ likeness ’ of products:
(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products ;
(ii) the end-uses of the products ;
(iii) consumers’ tastes and habits ; and
(iv) the tariﬀ classiﬁcation of the products.6
These criteria also played a role in the most recent ruling concerning ‘ likeness’ : the
Asbestos Case, which shed new light on the issue. The Appellate Body pronounced
that the evidence on each of the four criteria should be examined and then weighed
together with any other evidence in order to determine whether any one product
could be regarded as ‘ like’ any other one.7
2.4 Exemptions from basic principles
Exemptions from basic GATT principles can be made for ‘measures necessary
_ for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment’,
which must not lead to ‘arbitrary or unjustiﬁable ’ discrimination between coun-
tries (Preamble of the TBT Agreement). The same exception is stated in Article XX
(b) GATT, broadened by the provision in Article XX (g) for measures ‘relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made ef-
fective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’.
For national energy policy aiming at the reduction of a global environmental
problem, these exception clauses could become a last resort for individual WTO
members in cases where their national policy measures are held inconsistent with
WTO provisions.
6 BISD (1997: para. 18) and WTO–Alcoholic Beverages Panel (1996: para. 101).
7 In the Asbestos case, another important argument was that toxicity is ‘a deﬁning aspect of the
physical properties ’ of asbestos ﬁbres. See World Trade Institute (2001); Shaw and Schwartz (2002:
p. 150).
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In the literature, the scope of these provisions (see, for example, Althammer
et al., 2001) and the various trade and environment disputes settled by WTO
panels and Appellate Bodies (for example, in the Tuna–Dolphin or the Shrimp–-
Turtle cases ; see Howse, 1998; WTO – Appellate Body, 1998) have been analysed
at great length. Moreover, a new dimension has emerged in the debate over the
legality of national actions that aﬀect foreign jurisdictions and are based on
multilateral agreement. The WTO agenda for a new round of trade liberalisation
includes clarifying the relationship between multilateral environmental agree-
ments and the WTO law. Such a clariﬁcation would draw a line between trade
measures that are enacted unilaterally (which may be allowed under Article XX),
and trade measures that are currently required by a multilateral environmental
agreement but not dealt with speciﬁcally under WTO law.8 Because the Kyoto
Protocol has not yet entered into force, there are no multilateral environmental
agreements that act as a legal basis for national climate change measures. Thus,
only the case-by-case interpretation of GATT exceptions would currently come
into play in any conﬂicts over national energy policy measures that discriminate
against other WTO members.
Border tax adjustments illustrate the issue further (see Section 5). Neither the
1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change nor its 1997 Kyoto Protocol
explicitly require or endorse border tax adjustments or other speciﬁc trade-
relevant policies. Parties are obliged, however, to enact policies and measures
designed to achieve the objectives of the climate convention, while at the same
time maintaining an open trading system. The legal interpretation would require
recourse to the actual practice of parties, because neither the convention, the
protocol, nor decisions by the parties have addressed the issue of border tax
adjustment or other trade-relevant environmental policies in any suﬃcient detail.
Hence, it seems that if a suﬃciently large number of states enacted similar trade-
relevant climate protection policies, these schemes could be justiﬁed by Article XX
GATT instead of being seen as a violation of the GATT.
3. Labelling
The term ‘ecological label ’ generally refers to information attached to products
that helps buyers and suppliers make purchasing decisions based on the product’s
environmental impact. We refer to ‘the use of labels in order to inform consumers
that a product is determined by a third party to be environmentally more friendly
relative to other products in the same category’ as deﬁned by UNCTAD (1994: 5).
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) distinguishes among
three diﬀerent types of ecological labels, but only type I matches the UNCTAD
8 For a discussion of Article XX reform proposals see Althammer et al. (2001); Biermann (2001).
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deﬁnition: ‘Type I is the eco-seal awarded as a license and based on a labelling
programme’.9
For trade law analysis, the distinction between voluntary and compulsory labels
is important, as it is reﬂected in WTO deﬁnitions of speciﬁc types of regulation
(see Section 3.2 below). Voluntary labels can comprise three categories: they can
be governmental, private, or quasi-governmental.10 Voluntary labels leave it up
to each individual producer to choose whether to meet the ecological criteria for
a speciﬁc programme and to use the label for marketing purposes. Compulsory
labels are command and control measures : they require that producers meet
certain standards and regulations. Otherwise the label will not be granted and
the producer will be denied market access.
Labels can support national climate change policies by providing important
information on both, production processes and direct product characteristics.
In many cases, ecological programmes attempt to apply life-cycle analyses (LCA),
which are designed to include all possible information on a product’s environ-
mental impacts from ‘cradle to grave’, for example, generation of inputs, pro-
duction processes, waste disposal during production, and product disposal after its
use. Most schemes, however, simply focus on certain environmental eﬀects of
production, since in many areas a complete life-cycle assessment is diﬃcult and
expensive (Mullett, 1997: 383). There is an ongoing debate on the criteria that
should be used when setting up a labelling programme for ‘green’ electricity.
Electricity is a homogenous good that does not incorporate any characteristics of
its production method. In order to attach the energy generation process to the
product as a characteristic, control and certiﬁcation of diﬀerent electricity sources
are necessary and would lead to separate markets for electricity from diﬀerent
sources. The criteria for ‘green’ production, that is, production based on renewable
resources, could include (i) the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, (ii) resource
intensity, (iii) processes and procedures involved in establishing new capacities
(production of solar cells, the construction of hydropower stations, etc.). Such
criteria could be implemented using quotas, for example by including a share
of new high-tech power stations in the overall production portfolio of a regular
supplier in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; or by using a range of
environmental data for the local ecological impact of speciﬁc types of power
stations, such as hydrostations.
3.1 Application in Germany
The ecological labelling of products has a long tradition in Germany, starting with
the introduction of the Blue Angel in 1977. Under the Blue Angel scheme, energy
9 Type II is the self-declaration claim made by producers, importers, and retailers on products and
services, Type III is the report card label, which gives information according to ﬁxed indices, similar to
general consumer information on product packages. Cited from OECD (1997: 9f).
10 The EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency) labels mixed schemes involving governmental
agencies and NGOs as ‘quasi-governmental’ ; for more examples see WTO–CTE (2000).
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eﬃciency became a criterion for judging the environmental impact of diﬀerent
products. The explicit labelling of the energy consumed by products was
introduced in 1998 by the energy laws Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsgesetz
(EnVKG) and Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsverordnung (EnVKV). The label-
ling of electricity according to its origin and production became popular following
the liberalisation of electricity markets in Europe during the 1990s. The German
electricity market was liberalised in 1998. Currently, consumers can choose
among diﬀerent suppliers and ‘packages’ with varying ﬂat rates and pricing
structures. To meet the rising demand for information on the origin of electricity,
suppliers are diversifying their product range by specifying the energy sources used
in production. As part of this process, labelling schemes have become increasingly
important.
At present several initiatives by German non-governmental organisations award
labels to electricity producers who use renewable resources.11 These voluntary
programmes all aim at creating a market for clearly identiﬁable ‘green’ electricity.
However, they also assign the ‘green’ label to electricity from block-type thermal
power stations and other combined heat and power stations that use some non-
renewable sources like coal or gas. This is justiﬁed by the high eﬃciency of these
combined heat and power technologies. Nevertheless, labels should make a clear
distinction between electricity from renewable sources and electricity from non-
renewable sources using technology of above-average eﬃciency. Otherwise, they
lead to inconsistencies.
The EnVKG (Law on Labelling and Limits of Energy Consumption) mandates
that producers provide a label with additional information specifying the energy
consumption and use of other resources as well as CO2-emissions for all technical
devices and vehicles used in producing the product. Germany has also to comply
with EU directive 2001/77/EC (27.9.2001), which requires that EU members issue
guarantees of origin for traded electricity from renewable energy sources on re-
quest. These proof-of-origin certiﬁcates are compulsory, and had to be introduced
by the end of 2003 in all EU member countries.
3.2 Potential conﬂicts with WTO law
Trade-related impacts are all measures that make market entry for foreign ﬁrms
more costly and foreign products less competitive. Eco-labels and proof of
origin requirements for electricity may create the following barriers to foreign
companies: (i) Foreign producers could have problems getting information on
voluntary eco-labelling schemes, proof-of-origin requirements, and tradable green
certiﬁcate programmes in target markets. (ii) Regulations such as proof-of-origin
requirements for speciﬁc products could be applied in discriminatory ways to
11 Examples are ‘Gru¨nstrom’ of the Institut fu¨r angewandte O¨kologie e.V., ‘Gru¨ner Strom’ Label by
EUROSOLAR, BUND, NABU; ‘Gu¨tezeichen fu¨r O¨kostrom’ of the O¨ko-Institut/Bremer Energie Konsens
(Timpe, 1999).
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foreign suppliers, for example by asking them to meet higher labelling standards
than domestic suppliers. These regulations can also pose indirect barriers, for
example when foreign ﬁrms are excluded because a label is awarded only to sup-
pliers using speciﬁc processes and production methods (PPMs) based on domestic
conditions.12 (iii) A labelling or a green certiﬁcate scheme could explicitly exclude
foreign ﬁrms, thus constituting a direct barrier to market access.
There are currently no explicit trade rules that govern green product labelling.
WTO rules applicable to labelling can be found in the TBT Agreement and in the
GATT. The TBT Agreement states that WTO members should coordinate the
introduction and application of national standards and technical rules at an in-
ternational level. Moreover, it outlines a system of mutual information sharing
and consultation to increase the transparency of national measures.
According to the TBT Agreement, voluntary programmes and their criteria are
regarded as standards, while mandatory labels fall under the category of technical
regulations (Annex 1.1 and 1.2 to the TBT Agreement, see McGovern, 2003: para.
7.24). As WTO rules are applicable only to those national policies that aﬀect
international trade (Buck and Verheyen, 2001: 15), private, non-governmental
voluntary labelling initiatives cannot be addressed directly via WTO mechanisms,
even if trade distortions arise. As trade eﬀects alone do not automatically trigger
measures under WTO law, such conﬂicts must be dealt with through bilateral
consultation instead.
The WTO legal texts do not explicitly refer to labels based on speciﬁc pro-
grammes, but rather to all kinds of labels with product information. A product can
be declared environmentally friendly on three diﬀerent but interrelated grounds:
product criteria (that is, consumption externalities), product-related criteria (that
is, externalities stemming from production, which are incorporated in the prod-
uct), and non-product-related criteria (that is, production externalities not incor-
porated in the ﬁnal product). Non-product-related issues are especially relevant
for life-cycle analyses. These categories are subject to diﬀerent treatment under
WTO law (see Section 2.2). Several studies conclude that non-product-related
criteria found in ecological labelling programmes are not included in the stan-
dards permitted to distinguish products under the TBT Agreement (Chang, 1997;
Michaelowa, 1997). Nevertheless, as long as there is no explicit ruling that pro-
hibits distinguishing products based on non-product-related standards, it is an
open issue whether this violates the TBT Agreement.
Mandatory – as opposed to voluntary – labelling of a product’s processes and
production method is subject to TBT rules because they fall under the deﬁnition of
technical regulations, regardless of the product to which the labelling applies. TBT
rules state that technical regulations must involve ‘treatment no less favourable
12 This can cause severe barriers to market access, especially for ﬁrms from developing countries.
Industrial countries’ production standards are not relevant for some countries, due either to diﬀerent
environmental conditions or to the actual production technologies.
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than that accorded to like products of national origin’ (Article 2.1 TBT Agree-
ment) and ensure that there are no ‘unnecessary obstacles to international trade’
(Article 2.2 TBT Agreement). This would mean that rules on proofs of origin for
energy suppliers must not discriminate against foreign suppliers.
The investigation into voluntary ecological labelling has to go beyond the TBT
Agreement and address whether basic GATT rules apply to ecological labelling
programmes that are not covered by the TBT Agreement. In the Tuna–Dolphin
conﬂict (1991), Mexico felt that the US ‘Dolphin-safe ’ label discriminated against
Mexican tuna, and referred to Article I GATT (the most-favoured nation prin-
ciple). The GATT panel,13 however, rejected this claim on the grounds that the
label was granted irrespective of the canned tuna’s country of origin (Chang,
1997: 150; Altemo¨ller, 1998: 254). Thus, whether or not a voluntary eco-label
violates the most-favoured nation principle depends on whether or not one
country helps another country to gain advantages from selling the labelled
product (Tietje, 1995; Chang, 1997: 151). Therefore, the information given by
a label on the production method (non-product-related PPM) is not relevant to
the most-favoured nation clause.
WTO dispute settlement bodies have made no explicit statements to date on
Article III (4) GATT (the national treatment principle) with respect to trade eﬀects
of non-product-related labelling criteria. However, as already mentioned, deci-
sions have been made on the likeness of products (in the Alcoholic Beverages Case
and the Asbestos Case). In general, identical goods produced with diﬀerent
methods are regarded as ‘ like products’. Labels designed to diﬀerentiate goods
using the PPMs would therefore not automatically lead to a diﬀerentiation in
WTO terms. And this does not generate a conﬂict as long as domestic and foreign
‘like products’, as a group, are not treated diﬀerently (Howse and Tuerk, 2001:
289).14
If consumers refuse to buy a product because the country of origin does not use a
certain production method, discrimination takes place, but Article III (4) is not
applicable. Article III (4) also prescribes that equal treatment should comprise
‘all laws, regulations and requirements aﬀecting their internal sale, oﬀering for
sale, purchase’. The term ‘aﬀecting’ has been interpreted very broadly and has
opened up room for non-compliance with national treatment obligations under
Article III (4) for labels that lead to discrimination against foreign products based
on non-product-related PPMs (Tietje, 1995: 140; Chang, 1997: 153).
13 GATT Tuna Panel (1991).
14 A similar conﬂict arose in 1992 when Austria subjected tropical timber to a mandatory national
label that required sustainable forestry as production method. Malaysia felt discriminated against by this
label and claimed that application of the criterion ‘sustainable forestry’ is not in accordance with Article
III (4), because the forestry method used is not a characteristic of the wood itself as long as this method is
not an international standard and is not applied to other types of wood. However, the panel did not have
to reach a ruling as Austria andMalaysia settled out of court (See Sucharipa-Behrmann, 1994: 56; Mullet,
1997: 393).
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Nevertheless, even when GATT basic principles are violated, governments can
always fall back on the general exemptions in Article XX GATT. But since no
conﬂict over ecological labelling has emerged so far, the relevance for Article XX
GATT has not yet been investigated. Past conﬂicts over trade and the environment
that were brought before GATT dispute settlement and legal analyses (as discussed
in Section 2.4) clearly show that there is room for environmental policy instru-
ments that can help preserve global resources.
For all the reasons mentioned, the legality of electricity labelling schemes under
WTO law clearly depends on how they are designed and implemented. Diﬀer-
entiating a homogeneous good according to its PPMs does not contradict WTO
law as long no member country discriminates against another or creates unjustiﬁed
obstacles to international trade. Moreover, even if labels were determined to
violate basic trade rules, the question would arise whether the exception in Article
XX (g), i.e. protection of a global resource, applies. Currently, electricity labelling
is not mandatory in Germany. If it were mandated by German law – and not just
supported by private initiatives – other countries would be able to challenge such
laws based on the TBT Agreement or general GATT principles. However, if none
of its members lodged a complaint, the WTO would not intervene.
The EU-wide introduction of proofs of origin for energy from renewable re-
sources (EU directive 2001/77/EC) is mandatory and thus a technical regulation
according to WTO law. This treatment is independent of the label’s subject, which
means that a proof of origin can be demanded for any production method. The
requirement to supply a proof of origin conforms to WTO law as long as there is
no discrimination against suppliers from other WTO member countries.
3.3 Conclusions and policy options
Labels are a tool that can help to inform consumers and other interested parties
about the environmental impacts of a product. They are becoming popular with
non-governmental organisations in Germany as a means of distinguishing other-
wise homogenous electricity forms according to the production method used.
Their major goal is to foster renewable power generation by establishing and
broadening markets for ‘green’ electricity and thus to support German eﬀorts to
reduce GHG emissions.
There is no reference to ecological labelling in WTO law as such. Compatibility
with WTO law depends on the TBT agreement, which deals with standards and
technical regulations, and on the basic principles of the GATT. Mandatory labels
are fully covered by WTO law and they may be used as long as they do not
discriminate against foreign suppliers. It is not clear, however, whether voluntary
labels with speciﬁc emphasis on non-product-related processes and production
methods are covered by WTO rules. This question could only be answered if a
complaint were lodged with the dispute settlement bodies. Standards on PPMs can
cause conﬂict under WTO law if other WTO members feel discriminated against.
Currently, the resolution of such conﬂicts would depend on how WTO dispute
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settlement bodies interpret both non-product-related standards and their validity
in distinguishing otherwise ‘ like’ products, and on what role labels would play in
protecting a global resource.
A long-term policy goal for the labelling of environmentally friendly electricity
generation should be to work towards international co-ordination of national
approaches parallel to or within the Kyoto Protocol consultations. Co-ordination
would make it easier for producers to use labels in compliance with international
trade rules and would lead to greater transparency in worldwide electricity pro-
duction. The concept of a ‘green single-subject label ’ for electricity production
methods and the creation of internationally agreed criteria need further analysis
and discussion.
4. Green certificates
Certiﬁcates are a crucial tool of international climate policy. The Kyoto Protocol
stipulates the introduction of internationally tradable CO2 emission rights (see
Buck and Verheyen, 2001, for a detailed analysis of WTO issues related to CO2
emission trading). The concept of green certiﬁcates is similar to that of tradable
pollution permits, the diﬀerence being that green certiﬁcates document the number
of electricity units produced in an environmentally friendly manner, instead of
certifying units of pollution rights.15 The electricity units are sold at market rates
but producers receive additional revenues from the certiﬁcate market. Demand
for green certiﬁcates could be created by domestic regulation of the energy sector.
By setting quotas which determine the minimum share of electricity that must stem
from renewable resources, producers are forced either to buy certiﬁcates from
green producers or – depending on certiﬁcate prices – to invest in green tech-
nologies and sell green certiﬁcates themselves. In any case, by introducing green
certiﬁcates, a government enables producers to meet their obligations without
immediate changes of production technologies.
Besides the information on the power units generated, green certiﬁcates can be
designed to:
. include information about the type, location and time of power generation;
. be tradable across suppliers and across national borders.
4.1 Application in Germany
Currently, Germany has no green certiﬁcation system, although green certiﬁcates
are a subject of policy debate. Instead, support mechanisms from the Renewable
15 It is an open issue how ‘green’ electricity imports should be taken into account in a country’s GHG
balance under the Kyoto Protocol. Bra¨uer et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the co-existence of markets for
CO2-emission rights and for green certiﬁcates will lead to ineﬃciencies. The option to reﬁnance the
emission obligations in either the green certiﬁcate or the CO2 emission market leads to suboptimal choice
of technologies.
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Energies Act (EEG) have been used to foster the production of renewable energy.
This law guarantees a minimum price per unit of power from renewable sources
and allows grid operators to buy any amount supplied to them at this price (see
also discussion in Section 6). Thus, there is no explicit targeting of quantities.16
However, the German support measures for renewable power generation are also
guided by the targets stipulated in the European Union White Paper, which states
that 12% of gross energy consumption in 2012 should stem from renewable
sources (see European Commission, 1997). Improved eﬀectiveness in reaching this
goal could be achieved by green certiﬁcation, which would enable the targeted
amounts to be clearly assigned and give electricity producers incentives to invest in
green technologies based on the certiﬁcate market price. A Europe-wide system of
tradable green certiﬁcates, the Renewable Energy Certiﬁcate System (RECS), has
been under construction since 1998. The participants are members from European
energy companies, governments and energy consultants.17
4.2 Green certiﬁcates and WTO rules
As no international green certiﬁcate trading system exists at present, it is only
possible to mention some preliminary considerations regarding WTO law. The
ﬁrst question would be whether green certiﬁcates should be regarded as ‘goods’
(or ‘commodities ’ or ‘products ’) under the GATT 1994 or as ‘services’ under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS, 1994). Green certiﬁcates are
derivatives of the product ‘electricity ’ from renewable sources. A speciﬁed amount
(proportion) of green electricity is subject to trading, but the physical power is sold
and distributed separately.
If one assumes that tradable green certiﬁcates can be treated as products under
the GATT, the basic principles for trade in goods apply: most-favoured nation
treatment and national treatment. However, tradable green certiﬁcates may also
fall under the GATS. According to Article I of the GATS, there are four modes
of supply: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and
the temporary movement of natural persons (Article I : 2 (a) to (d) GATS). The
approach to the liberalisation of services in the GATS is based on a list of com-
mitments in speciﬁc sectors. If a country does not put a sector on this list, it is not
willing to negotiate on any of the four foreseen modes of market access for this
speciﬁc topic. Energy supply and related issues such as green certiﬁcates are
currently not listed by any WTO member. If trade in green certiﬁcates were to be
16 Regular power suppliers and networks are forced to distribute this ‘green’ energy and the extra
costs of supporting these technologies are born by consumers (who are charged 0.01 E/kWh extra for all
electricity). An example of how the share of speciﬁc ‘green’ energy can be calculated is given in Timpe
(1999: 7).
17 ‘RECS provides a mechanism for representing a speciﬁc instance of the production of a megawatt
hour of renewable electricity by a unique certiﬁcate which can be transferred from owner to owner before
being used as proof of generation, or exchanged for ﬁnancial support.’ See <http://www.platts.com/
features/greencertiﬁcates> and<http://www.recs.org>.
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listed under GATS, basic trade principles – as under the GATT – would apply:
most-favoured nation treatment (Article II GATS), market access (Article XVI),
and national treatment (Article XVII) for ‘ like services’ of any other member
country.
Under both GATT and GATS rules, it is relevant how a national certiﬁcate
trading system regulates access for foreign and domestic competitors. Compliance
with WTO rules is not fulﬁlled if quantitative restrictions on trade for foreign
sellers of certiﬁcates exist or if domestic market access is regulated in a dis-
criminatory way against providers from diﬀerent countries. Therefore, to design
national and international systems for tradable green certiﬁcates in compliance
with WTO rules, nations should agree either to mutually recognise national
certiﬁcates and their underlying criteria for renewable energy sources, or to
harmonise national systems.
5. Taxes
Economic theory diﬀerentiates between ecological taxes (or charges) on pro-
duction or consumption and taxes (or charges) on pollution. The concept of taxing
emissions and internalising externalities was ﬁrst suggested by Pigou (1932).
However, the implementation of a Pigouvian tax requires a substantial amount
of information in order to determine the optimal level of pollution. Therefore,
today’s ecological taxes are generally based on the price–standard approach (PSA).
This assumes that the desired level of environmental quality is determined in the
political process (Baumol and Oates, 1971).
With respect to energy policy, one can diﬀerentiate between a tax on primary
energy consumption and a tax on ﬁnal energy. The former is preferable because it
creates incentives for improving energy eﬃciency at all levels of the energy trans-
formation process. However, without international harmonisation, it would be
diﬃcult to introduce such a tax on primary energy because domestic ﬁnal energy
could be easily replaced by imported ﬁnal energy (Bach et al., 2002: 804).
In general, taxation is widely seen as a cost-eﬀective instrument for reducing
carbon dioxide emissions. Some even see potential for energy taxes to become the
main pillar of ﬁscal systems in the twenty-ﬁrst century (Barker, 1997: 239). Energy
taxes enable the long-term costs of climate change to be included in the price
system, thus bringing the private costs of carbon dioxide emissions into balance
with the environmental and social costs of global warming. A number of countries,
mainly in northern Europe, have already implemented energy or carbon taxes in
the context of broader ecological tax reforms.
5.1 Application in Germany
In 1999, the First Step Toward an Ecological Tax Reform Act came into force
in Germany. The Ecological Tax Reform (ETR) has two objectives: ﬁrst, lower-
ing energy consumption and improving energy eﬃciency in order to decrease
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greenhouse gas emissions; and second, using tax revenues to lower social security
contributions in order to increase employment. The ETR will thus ideally yield
a ‘double dividend’ (Kohlhaas, 2000; for a simulation study on the ETR see Bach
et al., 2002).
As a ﬁrst step, the German government increased the existing tax on gasoline,
heating fuel, diesel fuel, and natural gas, and introduced a new tax on electri-
city. There is no environmental tax on coal, however, which is the most carbon-
intensive primary energy source. From 2000–2003, four more steps of the ETR
followed, with yearly tax rate increases on gasoline and electricity. The govern-
ment also allowed some groups compensations and reductions (OECD and IEA,
2001: 85). Energy from renewable sources is exempt from the ecological tax
as long as it is either used by the producer directly or is supplied to an electricity
grid that is exclusively fed by renewable sources.
5.2 Implementation problems of environmental taxes
WTO rules do not pose any barrier to the implementation of national environ-
mental taxes as long as imports from WTO member countries are taxed in the
same way as domestic goods. Implementation problems often arise due to resist-
ance from domestic industry, however, which often results in adjustment measures
such as special exemptions or rebates for certain sectors (OECD, 2001a). In many
countries, domestic opposition to the introduction of energy taxes is based on the
popular perception that these taxes would negatively aﬀect the international
competitiveness of domestic industries. Whether the danger of a loss in competi-
tiveness is empirically demonstrable or merely the misperception of a tax pro-
posal’s potential ‘victims’, energy taxation is frequently seen as a major threat
to domestic industries. As a result, energy tax proposals have triggered strong
political opposition in the past and will likely to continue to do so in the future.
Political pressure from industry could thus create a serious obstacle to national
climate protection strategies.18
To oﬀset these – real or perceived – competitive impacts of energy taxes, one
option is a well-designed and internationally agreed border tax adjustment (BTA)
that would not undermine the environmental objective of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions. Although this instrument is rarely discussed in the current debate on
climate policy, it has great potential for helping to solve the competitiveness
problem mentioned above. We turn to a discussion of this instrument and its
eligibility under WTO law in the following.19
5.3 Border tax adjustment
Border tax adjustments have traditionally been implemented for economic, not
ecological, reasons. Theoretically, there are two concepts of where to levy a tax on
18 In some cases, strong opposition from industry lead to the complete failure of energy tax proposals.
See Baron (1997) for details.
19 For an even more detailed discussion see also Biermann and Brohm (2004).
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traded goods. First, the destination principle stipulates that goods should be taxed
in the country of consumption (Jackson, 1989). Each country is allowed to choose
its own domestic tax regime, and products from all countries are still able to
compete in the international market. The universal – that is, internationally har-
monised – application of the destination principle thus levels out the competitive
basis for all countries : exported or imported products are neither exposed to
double taxation, nor do they compete on diﬀerent competitive terms arising from
diﬀerent national tax levels. The second principle is the origin principle, which
requires that products be taxed in the country of production. If the origin principle
were internationally accepted and taxes were harmonised, border tax adjustments
would not be necessary.
In the context of discussions on the harmonisation of indirect taxes in the
European Economic Community, in 1968 GATT established the Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments, which chose the destination principle. The BTA
deﬁnition still represents the prevailing view within the WTO system (WTO–CTE,
1997: para. 28).
Application
Examples of border tax adjustments with an environmental aspect can be found
in the Superfund Tax and the Ozone-Depleting Chemicals Tax, both schemes
enacted in the United States. The Superfund Tax was introduced in 1986 as a
prior-stage speciﬁc tax on listed chemicals that were used in the production
of chemical derivatives. This tax was challenged successfully by the European
Community before a GATT panel (BISD, 1987).
However, the GATT panel only examined how the tax was applied, and not for
what political purpose. Since the US imposed the tax directly, it was considered
to be eligible for a BTA (Pitschas, 1995: 492). Additionally, the Superfund Case
dealt with inputs that were physically incorporated in the product, while energy is
consumed during the production process. This makes the case of energy more
complicated (see also below).
The US Ozone-Depleting Chemicals (ODC) Tax was introduced to implement
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It represented
a tax on the domestic consumption of certain ozone-depleting chemicals, either
directly or indirectly through the consumption of products manufactured using the
ODCs. Furthermore, the ODC Tax applied to substances used in the production
process that were not physically incorporated in the ﬁnal product (Brack, Grubb,
and Windram, 2000: 12).
The border tax adjustment of the ODC Tax was quite eﬀective in protecting the
domestic ODC industry from foreign competitors, while also allowing a gradual
phasing-out of ODCs in US industry. It established the importance of border tax
adjustments in the context of taxes with an environmental purpose (Brack, Grubb,
and Windram, 2000: 79). So far, no country has claimed that tax adjustments on
ODCs imported to the United States violate GATT or WTO regulations.
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Border tax adjustments under WTO law
When investigating whether WTO law restricts the implementation of border tax
adjustments on energy taxes, one needs to consider diﬀerent provisions and prin-
ciples of the WTO framework. WTO rules diﬀer for imports and exports, and no
regulations deal speciﬁcally with border tax adjustments.
A number of possible border tax adjustment systems are clearly not acceptable
under WTO law. First, direct taxes – such as income taxes or social welfare
charges for producers – are not eligible for adjustment under the GATT, whereas
indirect taxes – that is, taxes on products – are eligible. This distinction between
direct and indirect taxation, which follows from the prevailing destination prin-
ciple in the WTO system, has been generally accepted as the basis for GATT/WTO
provisions on border tax adjustments applied to both imports and exports.20 Thus,
only indirect taxes are eligible for adjustment in accordance with the destination
principle. This is embodied in diﬀerent GATT/WTO provisions and has also been
conﬁrmed by a GATT panel in the context of the US Domestic International Sales
Corporations (DISC) legislation in the 1970s (Biermann and Brohm, 2004).
Energy taxes are clearly indirect taxes. WTO law remains unclear about the
eligibility of indirect taxes for adjustment. This applies particularly in the case
of indirect taxes that are indirectly applied to end products. This method of
taxation includes input or process-related ‘prior-stage’ taxes on physical inputs,
on energy or on other parts of the production process. The 1970 Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustment could not reach a consensus on categorising ‘taxes
occultes’ – including taxes on advertising, energy, machinery and transport – that
is, their eligibility for border tax adjustments could not be determined (BISD,
1997: para. 15a).
Article II (2) GATT only refers to taxes applied ‘directly or indirectly’ to the
product, which in principle does not exclude inputs at diﬀerent stages of the
production process. Article II (2) (a) further states that ‘a charge equivalent to an
internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III
in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from which
the imported product has been manufactured in whole or in part ’. The use of the
word ‘article’ may indicate that the indirect tax is construed as being restricted
to products that are physically incorporated into the ﬁnal product. However,
the provision does not answer the question clearly. Article VI (4) with its wording
‘borne by products’ is as equally vague concerning exports as Article II (2).
The interpretation of measures related to prior-stage inputs and PPMs can also
be explored in related panel decisions. The panel report on the US-Superfund Case
decided that taxes on ‘materials ’ that were used for the manufacture of domestic
products may be taken into account when imposing border tax adjustments on
imported like products. The panel did not, however, indicate whether the chemi-
cals were physically incorporated in the ﬁnal product in any recognisable way.
20 See for instance WTO–CTE (1997), Dam (1970), Demaret and Stewardson (1994: 16).
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The 1979 SCM Code is also relevant for border tax adjustments on exports
and refers in paragraph (g) of its Annex to ‘the exemption or remission in respect
of the production and distribution of exported products of indirect taxes ’, which
is generally permitted. The remission of prior-stage cumulative taxes on goods
or services used in the production of products is, as stated in paragraph (h), only
permitted if the taxes are levied on goods that are physically incorporated into the
exported product. It remains unclear whether energy taxes fall under the provision
for prior-stage cumulative taxes. The 1994 ASCM slightly changed the impetus
behind these provisions. Under Annex II ASCM it is now allowed that countries
remit taxes on exports, if the taxes are prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on
inputs. Footnote 61 deﬁnes these inputs as ‘physically incorporated, energy, fuels
and oil used in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in
the course of their use to obtain the exported product’ (WTO–CTE, 1995). This
seems to change how the eligibility of energy taxes for border tax adjustments can
be interpreted and may imply that an indirect tax on a production input would be
eligible for adjustment if the inputs included energy, fuels or oil that were used or
consumed in the production process (see also Demaret and Stewardson, 1994: 31).
However, whether footnote 61 clearly allows for BTA on energy is the subject of
ongoing discussion.
5.4 Conclusions and policy options
The introduction of energy taxes has faced substantial resistance from industry
in many countries, frequently resulting in adjustment measures such as special
exemptions or rebates for certain sectors. In general, taxes are compatible with
WTO rules as long as there is no discrimination between domestic and foreign
products. This section focused on border tax adjustments for energy taxes that
could be used to oﬀset potential competitive disadvantages without watering
down the environmental tax objectives, for example, the reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions. However, a broader discussion about the feasibility of border
tax adjustments in the context of energy taxes has not yet taken place.
We have found that it is unclear whether border tax adjustments for energy
taxes are permitted under WTO law. Thus, we can only assess the chances of a few
conceivable border tax adjustment systems to be found acceptable. Direct taxes
are clearly not eligible for adjustment under GATT, whereas indirect taxes are
eligible. This distinction originates in the WTO system’s prevailing destination
principle, and has been generally accepted as a basis for WTO provisions on
border tax adjustments. The eligibility of indirect taxes for adjustment, however,
remains unclear when indirect taxes are indirectly applied to end products. This is
particularly relevant for energy as an input that is no longer physically present in
the ﬁnal product. One important argument supports the conclusion that energy
taxes would in general be eligible for border tax adjustment: the provision in
footnote 61 of the 1994 ASCM, which states that a country is allowed to remit
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taxes on exports for prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on inputs ‘physically
incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the production process ’.
However, the eligibility of such adjustments will depend heavily both on actual
state practice, which is crucial in determining the interpretation of the treaties, as
well as on decisions by the WTO dispute settlement system. Given the importance
of climate change policy for world trade and remaining ambiguities in WTO law,
it would be desirable for governments to initiate a process to reach a multilateral
understanding on the permissibility of border tax adjustments for energy taxation
and also for other inputs that are not physically incorporated in the ﬁnal product.
6. Subsidies
From an economic perspective, a subsidy can be deﬁned in a broad sense as an
economic beneﬁt received by a private agent from public funds at no cost or below
the costs of producing the beneﬁt. In a more narrow sense, subsidies can be
understood as ﬁnancial assistance (for example direct payments, tax exemptions)
provided by the government to the private sector. All economic deﬁnitions of
subsidies have one common characteristic : a beneﬁt is conferred from the public
on the private sector. Subsidies have long been used to regulate the economy as
well as to promote national policies. All countries use subsidies as a policy
instrument. A subsidy is not compatible with the idea of making polluters pay for
environmental damage. However, if properly designed and applied, subsidies may
contribute to an improvement of the environment in the long run.21
6.1 Application in Germany
In Germany, the consumers and producers of energy are supported through direct
payments, price guarantees, and tax exemptions. The Renewable Energies Act
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), which entered into force in April 2000,
introduced a system of ﬁnancial aid for power generation from renewable energy
sources. The EEG aims at achieving a 12% share for electricity produced from
renewable energy sources by 2010. The Act provides price guarantees for the
producers of renewable energy, like hydrodynamic power, landﬁll gas, ﬁredamp,
sewage gas, biomass energy, geothermal energy, wind energy, and solar radiation
energy. Grid operators are compelled by law to remunerate the producers using
the prices ﬁxed in paragraphs 4–8 EEG. The additional costs have to be borne by
the grid operators and will, at least in the long run, be passed on to consumers.
Similarly, the Co-Generation Act (Kraft-Wa¨rme-Kopplungsgesetz, KWKG)
promotes the use of the combined production of heat and power. The KWKG
stipulates guaranteed prices for electricity to be paid by the grid operators to the
energy producers of heat and power. The New Co-generation Act, which entered
21 See Kim (2000) for a detailed discussion.
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into force on 1 April 2002, protects the existing combined heat and power energy
production plants.
Furthermore, the German Ecological Tax reform (ETR) includes a series of tax
reductions in response to pressure groups’ continuing complaints about the tax
burden. The German government decided to reduce the burden caused by the ETR
for energy-intensive sectors, commuters, public transport and low-income house-
holds. Exemptions from the taxes on petroleum products, which were already in
eﬀect before the ETR entered into force, were prolonged (for example, for trans-
port by air and ship). As a result, it is mainly private households, the retail sector,
the road transport sector, service companies, public institutions and small enter-
prises that now pay the full ecological tax rate (Bach et al., 2002). The ETR also
provides funds for subsidies of energy production plants using renewable energy
sources. In 2002, these transfers amounted to 200 million Euros (BMU, 2002: 15).
6.2 Potential conﬂicts with WTO law
In principle, the WTO law follows a ‘non-subsidisation’ approach, although there
are detailed rules on the diﬀerent kinds of national subsidies. These rules include
Article XVI GATT and the ASCM. Article XVI (1) GATT states that in cases of
subsidisation, including income or price supports, ‘which operate[s] directly or
indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any
product into, its territory’, the contracting parties must be notiﬁed. According to
the ASCM, a subsidy can either be a beneﬁt-conferring ﬁnancial contribution from
public funds or a beneﬁt-conferring price or income support.
Environmental subsidies in general were regarded as non-actionable subsidies
during the Uruguay Round (OECD, 2001b: 13). Nevertheless, the exemption for
environmental subsidies, which had been agreed upon and was part of the ASCM
(Article 8.2(c)) until 1999, has not been renewed. Hence, the issue to be addressed
is whether the German price guarantees for producers of renewable energy
(EEG and KWK laws) have to be regarded as a subsidy at all under WTO law.
This would be the case if all three of the criteria legally deﬁning a subsidy were
satisﬁed:
1. A beneﬁt has to be conferred (Article 1.1(b) ASCM).
2. The measure must be speciﬁc (Article 2 ASCM).
3. There must be a ﬁnancial contribution by government or any form of income
or price support (satisfying the conditions speciﬁed in Article 1.1(a)(1) or
1.1(a)(2) ASCM).
(ad 1) In order to qualify for a subsidy according to Article 1.1(b), a governmental
measure requires that ‘a beneﬁt is thereby conferred’. There is no deﬁnition of the
term beneﬁt in the ASCM or any other WTO agreement. Past WTO rulings indi-
cate that a beneﬁt exists when the government measure makes the recipient ‘better
oﬀ’ than he or she would be without it in the marketplace (Benitah, 2001;
McGovern, 2003: para. 11.3133). In the case of the EEG and KWKG, a beneﬁt is
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conferred on the recipient because the grid operators are required to pay the legally
determined price, which is higher than the market price.
(ad 2) According to Article 2.1 (a) ASCM, speciﬁcity requires that the government
measure be granted selectively in law or in fact to an enterprise, industry, or group
of enterprises or industries (referred to in the ASCM as ‘certain enterprises ’).
Article 16.1 ASCM deﬁnes an industry as the domestic producers of like pro-
ducts as a whole.22 It seems obvious that the producers of energy from renewable
sources should be considered an industry, and that, therefore, the funding under
the EEG and KWKG should be considered speciﬁc. However, Article 2.1 (b)
ASCM speciﬁes an exception to this rule that is relevant in this case. If the legis-
lation, on which the granting authority bases its operations, establishes objective
criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy,
and if the eligibility is automatic and the criteria and conditions are strictly
adhered to, speciﬁcity shall not exist according to Article 2.1 (b) ASCM. These
conditions are satisﬁed by the EEG and KWKG and, therefore, render the ﬁnancial
support non-speciﬁc. However, Article 2.1 (c) ASCM speciﬁes an exception to
this exception (or a counter-exception) which might also be relevant in this case.
‘ If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-speciﬁcity resulting from the appli-
cation of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons
to believe that the subsidy may in fact be speciﬁc, other factors may be considered. ’
The factors listed in the next sentence include predominant use by certain en-
terprises and disproportionately large subsidies granted to certain enterprises.
It can be argued that this is the case for the EEG and the KWKG. Although even
private households are eligible for the ﬁnancial compensation speciﬁed in the
EEG, disproportionately large amounts of money may go to enterprises. Obviously
this judgement depends on the deﬁnition of the term ‘disproportionately large
amounts’. In our view, Article 2.1 ASCM leaves substantial room for inter-
pretation when applied to the EEG and KWKG. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to judge
whether speciﬁcity prevails according to Article 2.1 ASCM.
(ad 3) In order to qualify for a subsidy, a measure must involve a ﬁnancial con-
tribution by a government (Article 1.1(a)(1) ASCM). However, the payments to
electricity producers using renewable sources are a ﬁnancial contribution by the
grid operators and not by the government. Thus, the EEG and the KWKG do not
meet the requirement of Article 1(a)(1), ﬁrst sentence. This judgement is in line
with the recent ruling of the panel on United States xMeasures Treating Export
Restraints as Subsidies.23 The report argues that ‘by introducing the notion of
a ﬁnancial contribution, the drafters [of the ASCM] foreclosed the possibility
of the treatment of any government action that resulted in a beneﬁt as a subsidy. ’
(WTO–Export Restraints, 2001: 8.38). McGovern (2003: 11.313) comes to
22 See also Grave (2002: 192) on this point.
23 WTO–Export Restraints (2001: para. 8.65).
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a similar conclusion: ‘The requirement of a ﬁnancial contribution reﬂects an in-
tention not to include in the notion of subsidy all governmental measures confer-
ring beneﬁts’.
The measures of the EEG, however, might still be considered an income or price
support under 1.1(a)(2) ASCM. According to McGovern (2003: 11.3132) the
deﬁnitions of income or price supports have not received much attention. In a
decision from 1960, a GATT panel pronounced that a subsidy is deemed to exist
only when support measures result in a loss to the government. Thus, within the
terms of Article XVI, a guaranteed price paid by a government for a product would
constitute a subsidy. Grave (2002: 252) arrives at a similar conclusion. He argues
that the contracting parties of the GATT 1947 assumed that income and price
support requires the use of government resources. However, the government does
not grant producers the price guarantees under the EEG and KWKG. Rather,
it forces two independent private actors to strike a deal at predetermined prices
if certain conditions prevail. Therefore, the German approach to promoting
renewable energy production does not fall under the WTO deﬁnition of sub-
sidies according to Article 1(a)(2) ASCM. We may therefore conclude that the
provisions in the EEG and the KWKG for supporting power generation from
renewable energy sources do not meet the criteria for a subsidy as speciﬁed in
Article 1.1(a)(1) or (2).24
Hence, in the case of the EEG and the KWKG, only one of the three conditions
necessary to establish the existence of a subsidy is satisﬁed, namely the conferring
of a beneﬁt. The requirement of a ﬁnancial contribution by the government is not
met, and it is unclear whether speciﬁcity prevails in this case. Therefore, the price
support schemes under the EEG and KWKG cannot be classiﬁed as subsidies under
WTO law.
Unlike the price guarantees, the ﬁnancial transfers and tax exemptions under
the ETR must be considered subsidies according to Art. 1 ASCM. They confer a
beneﬁt, involve a ﬁnancial contribution from the government, and are speciﬁc, as
they target industries and/or groups of enterprises. However, as the subsidies are
not based on export performance or the use of domestic over imported goods, they
are not prohibited. They may, however, be actionable if they cause an adverse
eﬀect to the interests of other members as speciﬁed in Art. 5 ASCM. Whether such
an adverse eﬀect exists cannot be determined precisely. Presently, it seems unlikely
that the ﬁnancial transfers and tax exemptions under the ETR will harm other
member states ’ industries.
6.3 Conclusions and policy options
As we have shown, the German price guarantees for electricity from renewable
energy sources in the EEG and in the KWKG cannot be considered subsidies under
24 For a dissenting view, see Slotboom (2002), who argues that the German way of supporting
renewable energy generation is a subsidy according to Article 1(a)(1)(iv).
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WTO law, as there is no ﬁnancial contribution from the government involved.
The German way of promoting renewable energy relies on a mechanism that does
not infringe onWTO rules : the grid operators are forced to buy electricity from re-
newable sources at predetermined prices. The consumers bear the resulting higher
costs of producing from renewable sources via their electricity bill. As the money
does not pass through the hands of any government body, there is no ﬁnancial
contribution by government, and hence no subsidy. This mechanism may serve as
a blueprint for other countries, as it allows governments to promote the pro-
duction and use of energy from renewable resources without violating WTO law.25
However, the tax exemptions and ﬁnancial transfers under the ETR do infringe
upon WTO law. In order to avoid a conﬂict with other WTO members, the best
policy option would be to eliminate these speciﬁc subsidies, that is, not to grant
certain industries lower tax rates or exemptions from taxes under the ETR. This
would also help in achieving the goals of national climate change policies.
7. Conclusions
In this article we have analysed the relationship between national climate
change policy instruments and WTO rules with particular emphasis on the case of
Germany. Our main ﬁnding is that national policies whose aim is to reduce
greenhouse gases can be brought into compliance with international trade law.
This can be accomplished, ﬁrst, by labelling electricity from renewable resources in
various ways. Mandatory labels are subject to WTO rules and must not be used as
a protectionist tool ; voluntary labels are not subject to WTO rules but could
become a subject of trade conﬂict if the technology of electricity generation were
regarded as a characteristic of the traded electricity. In any case, it can be expected
that future information requirements about production methods in the energy
sector will lead to a diﬀerentiation of electricity based on its origin. Whether such
discrimination against a homogeneous product is compatible with the concept
of ‘ like products ’ under WTO law remains an open issue, the relevance of which
will increase with cross-border trade in electricity. Second, the design of trading
systems for green certiﬁcates should consider basic WTO principles if the ﬁrst
attempts made by European countries to set output quotas for energy suppliers
become a popular policy tool internationally. Third, our discussion of the scope
for applying border tax adjustments to energy taxes has shown that current WTO
law does not clearly deﬁne the eligibility of this measure. However, the balance
of evidence suggests that under certain circumstances, such adjustments could be
defended under WTO law. However, for political reasons, it seems advisable to
seek multilateral consensus on the interpretation of the relevant WTO provisions.
25 The European Court of Justice also found that the EEG is not a subsidisation according to European
law, since there is no state involvement; and private and public enterprises are treated equally (European
Court of Justice, 2001).
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Fourth, WTO law leaves room for promoting renewable energy using ﬁnancial
incentives that confer beneﬁts to the producers without violating the ASCM.
Hence, climate change policies can even rely on ‘subsidies ’ (in the economic sense)
without getting into conﬂict with WTO rules. Fifth, national policies aiming at
international environmental protection can always be justiﬁed as an exception
under Article XX (b) or (g) GATT if the countries do not apply such measures
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. However, instead of claiming these
exceptions to unilateral policy measures, countries should further strive to ﬁnd
solutions to the global climate change problem in the Kyoto process or should
devise national policy along the lines discussed in Sections 3–6 of this article. As
the case of Germany shows, it is possible to design national climate change policy
to be compatible with WTO law. Whether or not the Kyoto Protocol comes into
force in the near future, a variety of policy options are available to countries in
combating greenhouse gas emissions, and WTO law does not stand in their way.
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Appendix 1: German laws related to climate change covered in this article
. The Ecological Tax Reform (ETR) increased taxes on electricity and fossil
fuels on a yearly basis from 1999 to 2003.
. The Renewable Energies Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG)) and
the Co-generation Act (Kraft-Wa¨rme-Kopplungsgesetz (KWKG)) use price
guarantees or price mark-ups as their main policy instrument to save energy
or use it more eﬃciently.
. The Großfeuerungsanlagenverordnung (GFAVO) sets emission standards
for sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), dust, carbon monoxide,
ﬂuorides and chlorides in large combustion plants based on coal, oil and
natural gas.
. The Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsgesetz (EnVKG) and the Energiever-
brauchs kennzeichnungsverordung (EnVKVO) specify rules concerning
energy consumption in the use and production of products and labelling
requirements.
186 SU SANNE DR O¨ GE ET AL.
. The Energieeinsparungsgesetz (EnEG) and the Energieeinsparverordnung
(EnEV) regulate the saving of energy and the insulation of buildings,
respectively.
. The Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) regulates electricity and gas supplies –
but is not primarily concerned with environmental goals.
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